Competition and Equity in Health Care Markets by Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune
This is a repository copy of Competition and Equity in Health Care Markets.




Siciliani, Luigi orcid.org/0000-0003-1739-7289 and Straume, Odd Rune (2019) 






This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Competition and Equity in Health Care Markets
Luigi Sicilianiy Odd Rune Straumez
September 2018
Abstract
We provide a model where hospitals compete on quality under xed prices to investigate how
hospital competition a¤ects (i) quality di¤erences between hospitals, and as a result, (ii) health
inequalities across hospitals and patient severities. The answer to the rst question is ambiguous
and depends on factors related to both demand and supply of health care. Whether competition
increases or reduces health inequalities depends on the type and measure of inequality. Health
inequalities due to the postcode lottery are more likely to decrease if the marginal health gains
from quality decrease at a higher rate, whereas health inequalities between high- and low-severity
patients decrease if patient composition e¤ects are su¢ciently small. We also investigate the
e¤ect of competition on health inequalities as measured by the Gini and the Generalised Gini
coe¢cients, and highlight di¤erences compared to the simpler dispersion measures.
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1 Introduction
Recent and ongoing reforms in several OECD countries aim at stimulating competition and patient
choice among publicly-funded hospitals in order to improve quality of care (EXPH, 2015; OECD,
2012). In the U.S. Medicare and Medicaid programmes, hospitals are paid by Diagnosis Related
Group (DRG) since 1983. Medicare and Medicaid cover respectively individuals older than 65 years
and poor patients. The DRG system involves paying a xed tari¤ for every patient treated. In the
United Kingdom, under a policy commonly known as Payment by Results, hospitals are also paid
a tari¤ for every patient treated, and patients are free to choose the hospital. Hospital competition
is also present in other countries such as Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Norway. The idea
is that hospitals compete on quality to attract patients and are rewarded nancially for doing so.
Opponents of hospital competition argue that these policies will harm equity. For example, high-
quality hospitals will respond to competition by improving even more, while low-quality hospitals
will be left behind. A recent report by the European Commission highlights that despite the
extensive literature investigating the e¤ect of competition in the health sector, there is very limited
literature focusing on its equity implications (EXPH, 2015). Reduction in health inequalities is an
ubiquitous policy objective, and it is surprising that it has received little attention in relation to
competition. We contribute to ll this gap in knowledge.
In this study we extend the received theoretical literature by investigating (i) whether com-
petition increases or reduces the gap in quality between high- and low-quality hospitals, and (ii)
whether, as a result, competition increases or reduces health inequalities. We focus on two dimen-
sions of (pure) health inequalities (Wagsta¤ and van Dooerslaer, 2000, Section 5). The rst type
of health inequalities is what is commonly known, in the hospital context, as inequalities due to
postcode lottery: a patient living close to a given hospital might receive much poorer quality com-
pared to a patient living close to a good hospital (Dalton, 2014, p.4). We refer to this as postcode
inequality. The second type of health inequalities relates to disparities in health across patients with
di¤erent severity: if high-severity patients benet less from competition than low-severity patients,
health inequalities will worsen. The equity concern across severity groups is regularly reected
in sub-group analysis (by severity type) in cost-e¤ectiveness analyses (Sculpher and Gafni, 2001).
Given that we have two sources of health inequalities, we also investigate how competition a¤ects
the Gini coe¢cient, a commonly used measure to empirically assess health inequalities within or
across countries (Wagsta¤ and van Dooerslaer, 2000).
2
Our choice of theoretical framework is a Hotelling model with two hospitals located at the
endpoints of a unit line and competing on quality. In this respect we follow the existing theoretical
literature, where quality competition is typically analysed within a spatial competition framework.
We allow one hospital to have a comparative advantage so that hospitals provide di¤erent qualities
in equilibrium. We also assume that only a fraction of patients make choices about which hospital
to attend for treatment (with the remaining patients being treated as the closest hospital). This
fraction represents the degree of patient choice, which we use as our measure of competition. This
is a highly policy relevant competition measure in hospital markets, since patient choice can be
stimulated by the introduction or the enhancement of public reporting of quality indicators (Siciliani
et al., 2017).
Our key ndings are as follows. Whether competition increases or reduces quality di¤erences
across hospitals is generally ambiguous, and depends on three key factors related to the demand
for health care and the cost of health care provision, namely (i) decreasing marginal health gains
from quality, (ii) di¤erences in price-cost margins between high- and low-quality hospitals, and
(iii) quality-dependent unit treatment costs. The rst and third of these factors contribute in
the direction of quality convergence as a result of more competition, whereas the second factor
contributes in the opposite direction.
Whether competition increases or reduces health inequalities depends on the type of inequality,
and the e¤ect does not necessarily go in the same direction as the change in hospital quality
di¤erences. If health gains are linear in quality, postcode inequalities go hand in hand with quality
di¤erences: they increase (decrease) whenever competition induces quality dispersion (convergence).
However, if health gains are strictly concave in quality, then health inequalities can reduce even
if competition induces quality dispersion. Thus, competition is more likely to reduce postcode
inequality if marginal health gains from quality decrease at a higher rate, which also increases the
scope for quality convergence as a result of more competition in the rst place.
On the other hand, when considering inequality across severity groups, competition generally
reduces health inequalities between high- and low-severity patients, because high-severity patients
benet more from higher quality than do low-severity patients. However, this reduction can be
strengthened or weakened by what we refer to as composition e¤ects, which arise when competition
induces high-severity patients to exercise choice to a larger extent than low-severity patients, by
selecting hospitals with higher quality.
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We then derive the e¤ect of competition on aggregate measures of absolute and relative in-
equality, namely the Generalised Gini and Gini coe¢cients, respectively. These measures are con-
ceptually distinct from the above-mentioned measures of dispersion across hospitals and severity
groups. Consider for example the special case with just one severity group. Even if competition
increases di¤erences in health outcomes across hospitals (i.e., an increase in postcode inequality),
the Generalised Gini coe¢cient may still reduce if competition induces more patients to go to the
high-quality hospital. Similarly, even if competition has no e¤ect on di¤erences on health outcomes,
the Gini coe¢cient, which measures relative inequality, will still reduce as a result of the overall
increase in quality.
In the full model with two severity groups, we identify two key factors that play a crucial role
in determining the e¤ect of competition on aggregate (absolute or relative) inequality, namely (i)
the distribution of high- and low-severity patients and (ii) the degree to which health benets are
concave in quality. Since competition tends to reduce inequalities between high- and low-severity
patients, it also tends to reduce aggregate inequality if the relative shares of these two patient
groups are not too unequal, which means that inequality along this dimension has a large weight
in the aggregate inequality measure (Gini or Generalised Gini). Furthermore, if marginal health
gains decrease at a su¢ciently high rate, competition also tends to reduce postcode inequality, as
explained above, which further increases the scope for competition to reduce aggregate inequality.
Finally, although our analysis is predominantly positive, we also include a section where we
place our analysis in a normative context by specifying a policy objective function that incorporates
concerns for health inequalities. Following the approach by Wagsta¤ (2002), we dene a health
achievement index that reects both average health and inequality in the distribution of health,
and that is based on an extended Gini coe¢cient that allows for di¤erent degrees of inequality
aversion. In this part of the analysis we show that a su¢cient (but not necessary) condition for
competition to increase overall health achievement is that the market share of the high-quality
hospital does not decrease as a result of more competition.
In line with the existing literature, our theoretical model rests on the assumption that hospitals
are prot maximisers and suggests that an increase in competition increases quality (Ma and
Burgess, 1993; Wolinsky, 1997; Gravelle, 1999; Beitia, 2003; Nuscheler, 2003; Brekke et al., 2006,
2007; Gaynor, 2006; Karlsson, 2007). This result also holds with altruistic providers but only if the
degree of altruism is not too high (Brekke et al., 2011, 2012; see also Barigozzi and Burani, 2016).
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Equity is not addressed in the existing theoretical literature on hospital competition, though,
with the exception of Halonen-Akatwijuka and Propper (2013), who investigate hospital managers
incentive to invest in di¤erential e¤ort for two types of patients. They nd that competition
could favour the majority group at the expense of the minority one driven by cost substitution
across e¤orts. However, their analysis is di¤erent from ours in many respects. First, hospitals
are symmetric in costs, therefore ruling out postcode inequalities, which is a key focus for us.
Second, patient benets are linear in e¤ort, so that health inequalities always coincide with quality
inequalities. We instead show how increased inequalities in quality are compatible with reduced
health inequalities. Third, managers are semi-altruistic and are paid a xed salary under no
competition, while they have a no-prot constraint based on a tari¤ system under competition;
therefore, competition is modelled as a dichotomous variable which introduces a monetary incentive
to provide e¤ort. We instead treat the degree of competition as continuous, through a variable which
relates to the responsiveness of demand to quality (i.e., the degree of patient choice). Fourth,
manager e¤ort varies by patient type, the cost function is quadratic in e¤ort, and e¤orts can be
cost substitutes or complements. We instead assume that quality is common across patient types
and adopt a general cost function. Finally, we investigate measures of dispersion such as the Gini
index, and the Health Achievement index.
In the empirical literature, the seminal study by Kessler and McClellan (2000) suggests that
competition increases quality. This result is also conrmed by Tay (2003), but only partially by
Shen (2003), while Gowrinsankaran and Town (2003) nd a negative e¤ect. The latest evidence
from England suggests that competition, as measured by the introduction of patient choice policies,
increases quality under di¤erent empirical approaches (Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013;
Bloom et al., 2015). There is only one empirical study which directly tests the e¤ect of competition
on equity. Cookson et al. (2013) nd that competition did not harm equity, as measured by
di¤erences in hip replacement utilisation across socioeconomic status in England. This study is not
directly relevant for us given the focus on utilisation as opposed to quality and health outcomes,
and the focus on socioeconomic inequalities as opposed to pure health inequalities. Although not
focussing on equity, Kessler and Geppert (2005) nd that competition improved health for high-
severity patients but not for low-severity patients, therefore providing indirect evidence that health
inequalities across severity groups reduced.
As previously stressed, our approach is mainly positive rather than normative. Although we
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could derive the optimal pricing rule set by a welfare maximising regulator, in reality hospital prices
are xed and are set to reect average treatment costs. We therefore prefer to investigate how
competition a¤ects health inequalities under current common nancial arrangements. Similarly,
although optimal cost regulation (à la La¤ont and Tirole, 1993) could be introduced by a regulator
to mitigate the implications of cost heterogeneity across hospitals, we are not aware of policy
examples where regulators combine price regulations with partial cost reimbursement.1
The study is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and derive equilibrium
quality. In Section 3, we investigate how competition a¤ects quality di¤erences across hospitals,
and in Section 4, how competition a¤ects health inequalities. In Section 5 we place our analysis in
a normative context by adopting a policy objective function that incorporates a potential equity-
e¢ciency trade-o¤ in health care provision. Section 6 draws implications for empirical analyses and
Section 7 concludes the study.
2 Model
Consider a market for a healthcare treatment (e.g., a coronary bypass or a hip replacement) o¤ered
by two di¤erent providers (hospitals), located at opposite endpoints of a Hotelling line of length
1. Demand comes from a unit mass of patients who are uniformly distributed on the line. At each
point of the line there is a share  of high-severity patients, denoted by h. The remaining patients
have lower severity and are denoted by l. A patient of type k who is treated at Hospital i has the
following utility:
Uki (qi) = B
k (qi)  td, k = h; l; i = 1; 2, (1)
where Bk () is the (expected) health status of a patient with severity k following healthcare treat-
ment; qi  q is the quality of treatment at Hospital i; d is the distance travelled by the patient,
and t is the marginal cost of travelling. The lower bound q on quality represents the minimum
treatment quality that the hospitals are allowed to o¤er, and we can interpret the case of qi < q
as malpractice. We assume that: (i) for a given level of treatment quality, the patient with higher
severity is in worse health, even after treatment, Bh (q) < Bl (q); and (ii) the patient with higher
severity benets more from a marginal increase in treatment quality, i.e., @Bh=@q > @Bl=@q > 0
for all q. Thus, for a given level of treatment quality, the di¤erence in post-treatment health status
1The La¤ont and Tirole (1993) approach has been applied in the health context in several studies (e.g., Jack,
2005; Siciliani, 2006; Choné and Ma, 2011) including quality competition with a Hotelling set-up (Beitia, 2003).
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across high- and low-severity patients is smaller the higher the quality of treatment.
We also assume that, at each point on the line, a fraction  of the patients make utility-
maximising choices based on both treatment quality and travelling distance, whereas the remaining
fraction 1   always attend the closest hospital for treatment, regardless of the treatment qualities
o¤ered by the two hospitals. Thus, the parameter  measures the degree of patient choice in the
hospital market.2 For simplicity, we assume that  is equal for high- and low-severity patients.
Under the assumption of unit demand and full market coverage, utility-maximising behaviour




































while total demand for Hospital j is Dj = 1 Di.
Each hospital is assumed to maximise prots. Under the assumption that the (regulated) price
p is the same for both types of patients (e.g., DRG tari¤ for a coronary bypass)3, prots of Hospital









Dli   C(qi); (5)
where cki (qi) is the unit cost of treating a patient with severity k, and C(qi) is the xed (i.e., output
independent) cost of quality (e.g., MRI machines). We assume that the output-independent cost of
quality increases with quality at an increasing rate, @C=@qi > 0 and @
2C=@q2i > 0, that the unit cost
of treatment increases (weakly) with quality, @cki (qi) =@qi  0, and that the cost of treating a high-
severity patient is (weakly) higher than the cost of treating a low-severity patient, chi (qi)  c
l
i (qi)
for all qi. We also assume that hospitals di¤er in unit treatment costs, with Hospital 1 having a
2We give more specic interpretations of  in Section 3.
3Our model applies to a given treatment (e.g. hip replacement, coronary bypass) when patients vary in severity
and di¤er in their ability to recover their health due to pre-existing conditions, degree of frailty, pain in motion or at
rest, previous heart attacks etc. We treat the DRG tari¤ as xed across severity types. In practice, DRG tari¤s are
in some cases split based on observable patients characteristics, but there are rather crude since DRGs vary within a
treatment based on age thresholds (e.g. over 67 years old) and whether the patient has complications (mostly ex-post
ones, not before the surgery). Therefore, there remains extensive heterogeneity in severity within a DRG.
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cost advantage: ck1 (q1) < c
k
2 (q2) and @c
k
1 (q1) =@q1  @c
k
2 (q2) =@q2 for q1 = q2.
The hospitals simultaneously choose qualities in a non-cooperative one-shot game. We consider
an interior-solution Nash equilibrium in which both hospitals choose treatment quality above the




















































Given our assumptions on the hospitals cost functions, the Nash equilibrium is asymmetric and
the hospital with a cost advantage provides a higher quality, q1 > q

2.
3 Competition and quality di¤erences
What is the e¤ect of competition on quality provision? In particular, does ercer competition
reduce or amplify quality di¤erences between the hospitals? We measure the degree of competition
by the degree of patient choice, which is given by the parameter . A higher degree of patient choice
implies that the demand facing each hospital becomes more quality elastic, which yields stronger
incentives to compete for patients by providing a higher quality of treatment.
Our competition parameter  can be given two di¤erent interpretations related to relevant
policy measures for stimulating hospital competition. First,  can be interpreted as a measure
of the degree of information about quality in the market. More specically, let  be the share
of patients who are informed about the treatment quality o¤ered by the two hospitals, and thus
make choices based on both quality and travelling distance, whereas the remaining patients are
uninformed about quality and choose to attend the closest hospital in order to minimise travelling
costs. With this interpretation, the degree of patient choice, and thus the degree of competition,
is restricted by a lack of information about treatment quality. Consequently, competition can be
stimulated by policies that increase the amount of information available to patients, such as public
reporting of quality indicators. In our model, such a policy would be captured by an increase in .
4Second-order and stability conditions are given in the Appendix.
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Alternatively, competition could be hampered by administrative restrictions to patient choice,
with  measuring the share of patients who are allowed to choose which hospital to attend for
treatment. Thus, a policy of introducing free patient choice in a hospital market (where, previously,
all patients were administratively allocated to the closest hospital) would be captured by a discrete
increase in  from 0 to 1.
3.1 Competition and quality provision
In a symmetric model with prot-maximising providers and regulated prices, there is a well-
established positive relationship between increased patient choice and equilibrium quality provision
(as long as the providers have positive price-cost margins). In our asymmetric setting, however,
increased patient choice has additional e¤ects on unilateral quality provision incentives. On the
one hand, as in a symmetric model, increased patient choice makes demand more quality elastic,
which gives both hospitals an incentive to increase quality. On the other hand, for given quality
levels, increased patient choice implies that a larger share of each patient type chooses the high-
quality hospital. If unit treatment costs increase with quality, @cki =@qi > 0, such a reallocation of
demand implies higher (lower) marginal cost of quality provision, and therefore weaker (stronger)
incentives for quality provision, for the high-quality (low-quality) hospital. However, by applying
the rst-order conditions, (6), it can be shown (see Appendix) that the former e¤ect dominates
the latter, implying that the results from a symmetric model also carry over to an asymmetric
one. Increased patient choice leads to higher quality provision in equilibrium for both hospitals:
@qi =@ > 0, i = 1; 2.
3.2 Does competition lead to quality dispersion or quality convergence?
In the present study, we are foremostly interested in whether increased competition amplies or
reduces equilibrium quality di¤erences, dened by  := q1   q

2. If @=@ > 0, competition leads
to quality dispersion, whereas, if @=@ < 0, competition leads to quality convergence. Using




























where H > 0, @2i=@@qi > 0, @
2i=@qj@qi  0 and @
2i=@q
2
i < 0. Further details are given in the
Appendix.
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Proposition 1 The e¤ect of increased competition on the equilibrium quality di¤erence between the
hospitals is generally ambiguous and depends crucially on three di¤erent factors: (i) the degree of
concavity of the health benet function, (ii) the di¤erence in equilibrium price-cost margins between
the two hospitals, and (iii) the degree to which quality a¤ects unit treatment costs.
The general ambiguity is proved by the parametric examples given in the next subsection, and
the importance of (i)-(iii) in Proposition 1 is established by comparing how increased competition
a¤ects (all else equal) the marginal protability of quality provision for each of the two providers.
























































This expression consists of three terms. The sign of the rst two terms is a priori ambiguous,
whereas the third term is unambiguously negative, and the overall sign of (9) depends on each of
the three factors highlighted in Proposition 1.
(i) Concavity of the health benet function. A strictly concave health benet function implies
that the marginal health gain of quality is higher for patients in the low-quality hospital, which in
turn implies that demand responds more strongly to quality for this hospital. Increased competition
will therefore lead to a larger increase in the marginal revenue of quality provision for Hospital 2
than for Hospital 1, contributing, all else equal, to quality convergence between the two hospitals.
Formally, this e¤ect is reected by @Bk (q1) =@q1 < @B
k (q2) =@q2 in the rst two terms of (9).
(ii) Di¤erence in price-cost margins. Increased patient choice implies that demand becomes
more responsive to quality, which increases the marginal revenue of quality and gives both hospitals






2), the prot margin is higher for Hospital 1, which
implies that the increase in marginal revenue of quality provision, due to more quality-responsive
demand, is also higher for Hospital 1, which gives this hospital a stronger incentive to increase
quality. This e¤ect contributes, all else equal, to quality dispersion. Thus, (ii) counteracts (i) and
the sign of each of the rst two terms in (9) depends on the relative strength of these two e¤ects.
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(iii) Quality-dependent unit treatment costs. The increase in demand responsiveness due to
increased patient choice also implies that, for given qualities, demand is shifted towards the high-
quality hospital (i.e., @D1=@ > 0 and @D2=@ < 0). If unit treatment costs depend on quality, the
demand increase (decrease) for the high-quality (low-quality) hospital implies that the marginal
cost of quality provision increases (decreases) for the high-quality (low-quality) hospital. All else
equal, this gives the high-quality (low-quality) hospital an incentive to reduce (increase) quality.
This e¤ect works in the same direction as (i) and contributes, all else equal, to quality convergence.
In addition to the di¤erence in the marginal protability of quality provision between the hos-
pitals, which is determined by the relative strengths of (i)-(iii) as discussed above, the overall e¤ect
of competition on the equilibrium quality di¤erence also depends on di¤erences in the curvature
of the prot functions (evaluated at the equilibrium point), and on feedback e¤ects related to
the strategic interaction between the hospitals, as reected by the remaining terms in the square
brackets of (8).5 Our conjecture is that these additional e¤ects are likely to be of secondary order.
Notice also that the presence of feedback e¤ects relies on the existence of quality-dependent unit
treatment costs.6
3.3 Parametric examples
In order to further illustrate the main mechanisms at play, we will consider two di¤erent parame-
terisations of the health benet and unit treatment cost functions. In both examples, we assume
that the xed cost of quality provision is quadratic, C (qi) = (k=2)q
2
i . For expositional simplicity,
and without any signicant loss of generality, we also assume that unit treatment costs at Hospital
i are equal for both severity types, i.e., chi (qi) = c
l
i (qi) = ci (qi).
3.3.1 Decreasing marginal health gains and constant unit treatment costs
Suppose that unit treatment costs are constant and given by c1 < c2, and that the health benet
function is given by









2 depend on the signs of the
third-order derivatives of Bk (), ck () and C (), and are thus hard to interpret.
6From (A7)-(A8) in the Appendix we see that @2i=@qj@qi = 0 if @c
k
i (qi) =@qi = 0.
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where l > h and l > h. In this case, equilibrium qualities are given by
qi =
 (p  ci)
2kt+  (p  ci)
; (11)





2kt (c2   c1)
 
4k2t2   22 (p  c1) (p  c2)

(2kt+  (p  c1))
2 (2kt+  (p  c2))
2 > (<) 0 (12)




(p  c1) (p  c2)
:
Under the assumption of constant unit treatment costs, qualities are strategically independent.
Thus, with a general health benet function, the sign of @=@ will be largely determined by the
sign of (9), which in turn is determined by the relative strength of (i) and (ii) as dened in the
previous subsection. The result given in (12) conrms this intuition. Increased competition leads
to quality convergence if the degree of concavity of the health benet function (measured by the
parameter ) is su¢ciently large, which implies that (i) outweighs (ii). Otherwise, if  is su¢ciently
low, increased competition leads to quality dispersion.
3.3.2 Constant marginal health gains and quality-dependent unit treatment costs
Suppose that  = 0 in (10), such that marginal health benets of quality are constant, and suppose
also that unit treatment costs are given by c (qi) = ciqi, where c1 < c2. In this case, equilibrium














and the e¤ect of increased competition on the di¤erence in treatment qualities is given by
@
@















2 > (<) 0 (14)
if p > (<)
2kt2 (c1 + c2) + 3tc1c2

 
 (c1 + c2) + 2kt
 :
The assumption of constant marginal health benets of quality eliminates the rst of the three
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factors identied in Proposition 1, such that the sign of (9) is determined by the relative strength of
(ii) and (iii). In addition, the assumption that unit treatment costs depend on quality implies that
there are additional feedback e¤ects caused by strategic interaction between the hospitals. In this
parametric example we see that increased competition leads to quality dispersion (convergence)
if the price p is su¢ciently high (low). All else equal, a higher (lower) price increases (reduces)
the di¤erence in price-cost margins between the two hospitals, increasing (reducing) the relative
strength of (ii), which contributes to quality convergence (dispersion) as a result of more competi-
tion. Thus, the result given by (14) is consistent with our general analysis of the main mechanisms
identied in Proposition 1.
4 Competition and health inequalities
In the previous section we have identied the main mechanisms that cause competition to induce
either a reduction or an increase in inequalities in the level of quality across hospitals, which we
have referred to as quality convergence and quality dispersion, respectively.
In this section we investigate how competition a¤ects health inequalities. In our model we
have four groups of patients who di¤er in severity and the provider from which they receive the
treatment, and we answer this question in three steps. First, we look at inequalities in health
outcomes across hospitals. These can be thought of as inequalities arising from the postcode
lottery: some patients will have worse health outcomes than others simply because they live closer
to a low-quality hospital, what we refer to as postcode inequality. Second, we look at inequalities
in health outcomes between patients with high and low severity, and check whether competition
increases or reduces the health gap between the two patient groups. Third, we look at aggregate
measures of (relative and absolute) health inequality based on the Gini and Generalised Gini
coe¢cients, since these have been commonly used in the health economics empirical literature to
measure health inequalities.
4.1 Absolute health inequalities across hospitals (postcode inequality)
When considering health inequalities across hospitals, we restrict attention to inequalities within
each patient type. As long as health outcomes (e.g., mortality rates) are risk adjusted, the analysis
would be similar in the presence of patients with di¤erent severities. For a given level of severity,




k := Bk (q1) B



















If competition induces quality convergence, health inequalities across hospitals are also reduced. If
the marginal health gain from quality is constant, inequalities are driven by di¤erences in quality.
This e¤ect is reinforced if the marginal health gain from quality is decreasing and therefore smaller
in the hospital with higher quality. Reductions in inequalities in quality always reduce health
inequalities.
If competition induces quality dispersion, the e¤ect on health inequalities is instead ambiguous.
It is only when the health gain from quality is linear or not too concave that inequalities in levels
of quality go hand-in-hand with health inequalities, so that quality dispersion increases postcode
inequality. If the marginal health gain from quality is decreasing, the larger quality increase in
Hospital 1 arising from competition can be dampened or even o¤set by the smaller marginal health
gain of quality, and quality dispersion can therefore reduce postcode inequality.
Proposition 2 (i) If competition induces quality convergence, then it reduces health inequalities
across hospitals for each severity type. (ii) If competition induces quality dispersion, it increases
health inequalities when the health gain from quality is not too concave in quality; it reduces health
inequalities when the health gain from quality is su¢ciently concave. (iii) If competition has no
e¤ect on quality di¤erences across hospitals, it reduces health inequalities if the marginal health gain
from quality is decreasing.
The second part of the Proposition 2 can be illustrated by considering the parameterisation
used in Section 3.3.1. Since we are considering the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities for
a given severity type, the exposition is simplied by setting  = 1. With a quadratic health benet





4k2t22h (c2   c1)

8k3t3   22 (p  c2) (p  c1) ( (2p  c1   c2) + 6kt)

( (p  c1) + 2kt)
3 ( (p  c2) + 2kt)
3 : (17)
It is straightforward to see that the sign of (17) is positive (negative) if  is su¢ciently low (high).
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There are two di¤erent forces at play here, both of which work in the same direction. For a given
increase in quality provision by each hospital, a higher value of  (which implies a more concave
benet function) contributes directly towards less inequality in health outcomes. In addition, a more
concave benet function also increases the scope for quality convergence as a result of increased
patient choice, as shown by (12).
Consider an illustrative numerical example, with p = k = t = 1, c2 =  =
1
2 and c1 =
1
4 , which
yields the following e¤ects of increased patient choice on quality di¤erences and health inequalities:
(i)  < 3:26 : @
@




(ii) 3:26 <  < 6:53 : @
@




(iii)  > 6:53 : @
@




The interesting case is (ii). When the degree of concavity is in an intermediate range, increased
patient choice leads to quality dispersion but simultaneously reduces health inequalities within each
severity group, because marginal health gains from quality is decreasing at a su¢ciently high rate.
4.2 Absolute health inequalities between high- and low-severity patients
In this sub-section we investigate how competition a¤ects health inequalities across patient severity.
These could be due to patients di¤ering in severity within the same condition or across conditions.
For example, for patients who had a heart attack (within the same health condition), high severity
patients have a history of heart conditions or other comorbidities. Across conditions, we could
think of high-severity patients as patients with cancer as opposed to patients in need of a cataract
surgery (low-severity patients).7






























7Although our model has only one price, and therefore implicitly considers only one condition, the e¤ects of
competition on health inequalities would be similar in a model with more than one condition as long as the price
di¤erences across conditions remain constant.
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The rst term captures the e¤ect of competition on health inequality for given patient allo-
cations. Increased patient choice leads to higher quality provision at both hospitals. Since the
marginal health gain of quality is larger for high-severity than for low-severity patients, the in-
equality in health outcomes between the two patient groups is reduced. Therefore, the rst e¤ect
is unambiguously negative, and this is regardless of whether more competition induces quality
convergence or quality dispersion.
The remaining terms capture the e¤ects of changes in patient composition as a result of more
competition. An increase in the degree of patient choice makes demand more sensitive to di¤erences
in quality between the two hospitals. For given quality levels, an increase in  implies that a
relatively larger share of high-severity patients will choose the high-quality hospital. The resulting
e¤ect on health inequality is captured by the second term in (21) and is also unambiguously
negative. Once more, since the health gain of having access to higher quality of treatment is larger
for high-severity than for low-severity patients, the above described patient reallocation will also
reduce inequality in health outcomes across the two patient groups.
The last term in (21) capture the patient composition e¤ects that are related to changes in
quality provision as a result of more competition, and the overall sign of these e¤ects is a priori
indeterminate. Notice, however, that if the marginal benet of quality is decreasing at a su¢ciently
low rate, the direction of this e¤ect is uniquely determined by whether competition leads to quality
dispersion or quality convergence. To see this, consider the extreme case of linear health benets,
which implies @Bk=@q1 = @B
k=@q2 = @B


















By the assumption @Bh=@q > @Bl=@q, the expression in square brackets is positive. This implies
that the patient composition e¤ect through changes in quality provision also contributes in the
direction of less health inequality if competition leads to quality dispersion. Thus, in the case of
@=@ > 0, all patient composition e¤ects (given by the second and third terms in (21)) go in
the same direction. Since high-severity patients are more responsive than low-severity patients
to quality di¤erences, increased competition implies that the share of high-severity patients in the
high-quality hospital will increase for given quality levels, and this e¤ect is reinforced if competition
leads to quality dispersion. As a result, the health inequality between these two groups of patients
is reduced.
This analysis illustrates how increased disparities in quality across hospitals do not necessarily
imply increased disparities in health outcomes across patient types. In the above example, with
constant marginal health gains, the opposite holds. Since it is the most disadvantaged group, i.e.,
the high-severity patients, who benet most from di¤erences in qualities across hospitals, health
inequalities are actually reduced. By continuity, this holds also for health benet functions with
a su¢ciently low degree of concavity, which allows us to summarise the above derived results as
follows:
Proposition 3 (i) An increase in competition reduces inequalities across patients with di¤erent
severity if the subsequent changes in patient composition at each hospital are su¢ciently small. (ii)
If the marginal health gain from quality is constant or decreases slowly with quality, a su¢cient
condition for increased competition to reduce inequalities across severity types is that competition
leads to quality dispersion.
4.3 Aggregate measures of (absolute and relative) health inequality
In the previous subsections we have studied the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities along
two di¤erent dimensions: (i) inequalities between patients treated at di¤erent hospitals (postcode
inequality) and (ii) inequalities between high- and low-severity patients. An aggregate measure of
inequality which allows to trade o¤ inequalities along di¤erent dimensions is the Gini coe¢cient,
which is also a function of the share of (high/low severity) patients who receive high and low quality.
To illustrate the role of the latter we start out with a simplied framework with only one severity
level, and then extend to two severity levels.
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4.3.1 One severity level
With only one severity level, there are only two patient groups, those receiving high quality (at
Hospital 1) and those receiving low quality (at Hospital 2). Using the notational short-hand Bi :=












x if 1 D1 < x  1
; (23)
where B := D1B1 + (1 D1)B2 is the average health outcome. The Gini coe¢cient is then given
by
G = 1  2
Z 1
0
























=   (B1  B2)




2 < 0: (27)
All else equal, a marginal increase in the health outcome of patients at the high-quality (low-quality)
hospital will increase (reduce) the Gini coe¢cient. Furthermore, an increase in the market share
of the high-quality hospital  which initially has the larger market share  will reduce the Gini









2 (B1  B2) < 0: (28)
Thus, a marginal increase in health outcome for all patients will, all else equal, reduce the Gini
coe¢cient. This is a reection of the Gini coe¢cient being a relative measure of inequality, which
is reduced when all patients experience an equal absolute increase in health status.
We can convert the Gini coe¢cient to a measure of absolute inequality by multiplying G with
the average health outcome, which yields the Generalised Gini coe¢cient:












=   (B1  B2) (2D1   1) < 0: (31)
As for the Gini coe¢cient, a higher market share for the high-quality hospital will also reduce
absolute inequality, whereas a marginal improvement in the health status of patients at the high-
quality (low-quality) hospital will increase (reduce) absolute inequality. However, for given patient
allocations between the two hospitals, an equal absolute increase in the health status of all patients
has no e¤ect on absolute inequality (i.e., @ eG=@B1 + @ eG=@B2 = 0).
The e¤ect of increased competition on absolute inequality, as given by the Generalised Gini
coe¢cient, can be expressed as
@ eG
@



















The overall e¤ect is given by the sum of two e¤ects that potentially go in opposite direction. The
rst e¤ect is unambiguously negative. For given quality levels, increased patient choice implies a
reallocation of patients towards the high-quality hospital. This e¤ect, which is captured by the
rst line in (32), contributes to lower absolute inequality.
The second e¤ect is related to the e¤ect of competition on postcode inequality (given by @
=@).
This e¤ect is captured by the second line in (32) and is a priori ambiguous. Suppose that more
competition leads to increased postcode inequality (@
=@ > 0), which implies a reallocation of
patients towards the high-quality hospital (@D1=@ > 0). This has two counteracting e¤ects on the
Generalised Gini coe¢cient, given by the two terms in square brackets in the second line of (32). One
the one hand, for given market shares, absolute inequality increases because of increased inequality
in health outcomes. However, the reallocation of patients towards the high-quality hospital implies
that a lower share of patients experience low quality, which reduces the Generalised Gini coe¢cient.
The relative strength of these two e¤ects depends on the initial quality di¤erence. If the quality
di¤erence is small, so that D1 is close to
1
2 and B1 close to B2, then the rst e¤ect dominates and
a dispersion in health outcomes increases absolute inequality. On the other hand, if the quality
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di¤erence is very large, so that D1 is close to 1, the second e¤ect dominates and further dispersion
in health outcomes actually reduces absolute inequality.
The e¤ect of increased competition on relative inequality, as measured by the Gini coe¢cient,
can be expressed as
@G
@
=   (B1  B2)






































The rst two lines in (33) are completely equivalent to (32) and contain the two e¤ects described
above. However, the third line captures an e¤ect that is specic to the Gini coe¢cient and reects
the fact that G measures relative inequality. This is a pure level e¤ect and is unambiguously
negative. Even if more competition does not lead to any patient reallocations and does not a¤ect
the di¤erence in health outcomes across hospitals, such that the sum of the rst two e¤ects is zero,
the resulting higher quality at both hospitals nevertheless reduces the relative health inequality
between the two patient groups.
We summarise the above analysis as follows:
Proposition 4 Suppose that all patients have the same severity level.
(i) If competition leads to a dispersion (convergence) of health outcomes between the two hos-
pitals, this will, all else equal, contribute towards an increase (reduction) in absolute and relative
inequality if the initial quality di¤erence is su¢ciently small, and towards a reduction (increase) in
absolute and relative inequality if the initial quality di¤erence is su¢ciently large.
(ii) If competition has a su¢ciently small e¤ect on the di¤erence in health outcomes between
the two hospitals, more competition will reduce both absolute and relative inequality.
4.3.2 Two severity levels
The previous analysis with one severity level can be seen as an approximation of the case where
severity di¤erences are small relative to quality di¤erences between the hospitals, such that a patient
treated at the high-quality hospital always has a better health outcome than a patient treated at
the low-quality hospital, regardless of severity.
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Consider now the opposite, that severity di¤erences are large relative to quality di¤erences, in
the sense that the health outcome is always better for a low-severity patient than for a high-severity
patient, regardless of which hospital the patient is treated at. Thus, and using again the notational
short-hand Bki := B

























x if  Dh1 < x  
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1 is average health outcome. The Gini




















































Competition can a¤ect absolute and relative inequality along three main dimensions:
1. Competition can a¤ect postcode inequalities. For given patient allocations, this e¤ect is
described in Proposition 2.
2. Competition can a¤ect inequalities between high- and low-severity patients. This e¤ect is
described in Proposition 3.
3. Competition can a¤ect the relative shares of di¤erent patient groups, as highlighted by the
analysis in the previous subsection, which is summarised in Proposition 4.
For the case of one severity level, the e¤ects along the third dimension listed above are straight-
forward. If competition leads to patient reallocation towards the high-quality (low-quality) hospital,
this will  all else equal  contribute to lower (higher) inequality. For the case of two severity types,
which implies four di¤erent patient groups, the e¤ects along this dimension are somewhat more
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complicated. To illustrate this, consider the e¤ect on absolute inequality of patient reallocation































A reallocation of high-severity patients towards the high-quality hospital implies a reallocation
of patients from the group with the worst health outcome to the group with the second-worst
outcome. This will always reduce inequality. However, a reallocation of low-severity patients
towards the high-quality hospital, which implies a reallocation of patients from the group with
the second-best health outcome to the group with the best health outcome, will reduce inequality
only if the latter group constitutes more than half of all patients, which requires that the share of
high-severity patients () is very low.
The e¤ects of increased competition on absolute and relative inequality are analytically given by
some very involved expressions that yield limited additional insights. It is therefore more illustrative
to display the e¤ects by numerical simulations based on our previous parameterisations. Table 1
shows the e¤ects of increased competition based on the parameterisation in Section 3.3.1, with a
quadratic health benet function. The main mechanisms and trade-o¤s are captured by considering
four di¤erent numerical congurations, where we vary both the degree of concavity of the health
benet function and the share of high-severity patients.8 Cases where the marginal health gain
decreases at a low rate and at a high rate are shown in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. In each
of these cases, we consider both  = 12 and  = 1, where the latter assumption implies only one
severity level and therefore removes e¤ects related to inequalities between high- and low-severity
patients.9
Consider rst the case of  = 1. When all patients have the same severity level, the e¤ect
of competition on absolute inequality (as measured by eG) is determined by changes in inequality
along two di¤erent dimensions. On the one hand, higher (lower) postcode inequality contributes to
higher (lower) absolute inequality, whereas, on the other hand, increased (reduced) market share







satisfying the basic underlying assumption in this subsection.
9The case of  = 1 is obviously qualitatively equivalent to the case of  = 0.
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of the high-quality hospital contributes to lower (higher) absolute inequality. These two e¤ects are
always counteracting, as discussed in Section 4.3.1.
Table 1: Quadratic health function and constant unit treatment costs
Panel A: Marginal health gains decreasing at a low rate ( = 1)
 = 12  = 1
 
h 
l  G eG  
 G eG
 = 14 0:034 0:047 0:031 0:455 0:087 0:119 0:040 0:056 0:012 0:014
 = 12 0:058 0:078 0:049 0:415 0:077 0:112 0:070 0:091 0:018 0:023
 = 34 0:077 0:097 0:059 0:380 0:069 0:105 0:092 0:112 0:020 0:028
 = 1 0:091 0:110 0:064 0:348 0:062 0:098 0:109 0:125 0:021 0:031
Panel B: Marginal health gains decreasing at a high rate ( = 10)
 = 12  = 1
 
h 
l  G eG  
 G eG
 = 14 0:012 0:012 0:006 0:473 0:092 0:119 0:015 0:013 0:003 0:003
 = 12 0:012 0:009 0:003 0:462 0:088 0:116 0:014 0:009 0:002 0:002
 = 34 0:011 0:007 0:001 0:457 0:087 0:115 0:013 0:006 0:001 0:001
 = 1 0:009 0:005 0:001 0:453 0:086 0:114 0:011 0:004 0:001 0:001
Remaining parameter values: c1 =
1
4 , c2 =
1
2 , p = t = k = h = l = 1, h = l =
3
2 :
If the marginal health benet of quality decreases at a low rate (Panel A), increased competi-
tion leads to quality dispersion (@=@ > 0), with a corresponding increase in postcode inequality
(@
=@ > 0). This e¤ect is su¢ciently strong to outweigh the e¤ect resulting from a lower mar-
ket share of the high-quality hospital, implying that absolute inequality increases (@ eG=@ > 0).
Increased competition also increases relative inequality (as measured by G), though the increase
is relatively smaller for G than for eG because of the aforementioned level e¤ect, whereby higher
quality in itself reduces relative inequality. However, this e¤ect is not strong enough to prevent an
increase also in relative inequality as a result of more competition (@G=@ > 0).
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However, if the marginal health benet of quality decreases at a high rate (Panel B), increased
competition leads to quality convergence (@=@ < 0). The resulting decrease in postcode inequal-
ity (@
=@ < 0) is even larger, since a high degree of health benet concavity strongly reinforces
the e¤ect of quality convergence, as discussed in Section 4.1. Even if the market share of the high-
quality hospital decreases, which in itself increases relative and absolute inequality, the reduction
in postcode inequality is su¢ciently strong to cause an overall reduction in both G and eG as a
result of more competition.
Consider next the case of  = 12 . When patients di¤er in severity, the e¤ect of competition
on absolute and relative inequality is now determined also by changes in inequalities along a third
dimension, namely inequalities between high- and low-severity types, as measured by . We see
that competition always reduces inequality along this dimension, regardless of whether competition
leads to quality dispersion (Panel A) or quality convergence (Panel B). The reason is that high-
severity patients benet more from higher quality than low-severity patients, as discussed in Section
4.2.
If marginal health gains decrease at a low rate (Panel A), more competition has opposite e¤ects
on postcode inequality, which increases, and inequality between severity types, which decreases.
However, the latter e¤ect is su¢ciently strong to cause a reduction in both absolute and relative
inequality as a result of more competition. If marginal health gains decrease at a high rate (Panel
B), more competition reduces inequality along both dimensions; inequalities in health outcomes
decrease both across hospitals and across severity types. Once more, increased competition reduces
both absolute and relative inequality.
Overall, these numerical examples suggest that increased competition tends to reduce absolute
and relative health inequality, unless marginal health gains decrease at a low rate and di¤erences
in patient severity is not important (i.e., if  is close to 1 or 0). An important driving force
behind a negative relationship between competition and (aggregate) inequality is that competition
reduces health inequalities between high- and low-severity patients, which tends to be a dominant
mechanism for reducing absolute and relative inequality as long as the shares of high- and low-
severity patients are not too uneven.
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5 Inequality aversion
Up to this point, our analysis has been purely positive, in the sense that we have analysed how
competition a¤ects various dimensions of health inequality. In this section we bring our analysis
into a normative context by introducing a policy objective function that incorporates concerns for
health inequalities. This part of our analysis takes inspiration from Wagsta¤ (2002) who proposes
a Health Achievement Index that captures the potential trade-o¤ between mean health and health
inequality in a single summary measure. This index is based on the notion of an extended Gini
coe¢cient, which highlights the ethical judgements underpinning the Gini coe¢cient and allows for
di¤erent degrees of inequality aversion.
5.1 Extended Gini coe¢cient
Following the approach by Wagsta¤ (2002), the extended Gini coe¢cient measures health inequal-
ities as a function of inequality aversion,
G(v) = 1  v(v   1)
Z 1
0
(1  x)v 2L (x) dx; v > 1; (39)
where v is a parameter which relates to inequality aversion and L (x) is the Lorenz curve. The
approach draws on Yitzhaki (1983) who developed the indicator in the context of income inequal-
ities.10
Applying the extended Gini coe¢cient to our model, the underlying ethical judgements are












i =B is the share of total health enjoyed by patient group (i; k), while R
k
i is the groups
fractional rank (in terms of health status). Therefore, v(1 Rki )
v 1 can be interpreted as the weight
given to group (i; k). For v = 1, this weight is equal to one for all groups, which yields G(1) = 0,
implying that inequalities generate no concerns. For v > 1, the weight is monotonically decreasing
in R, implying that individuals with better health are given a lower weight. For v = 2, the weight
10An alternative to the extended Gini coe¢cient is the Atkinson index (1970), but this has the disadvantage that
it cannot represent the Gini coe¢cient as a special case. See Le Grand (1987) for an empirical application in relation
to health inequalities.
25
is equal to one for R = 12 and we recover as a special case the Gini coe¢cient, where patients with
health above the median (R > 12) have weights below one and those below the median (R <
1
2)
have weights above one. For values of inequality aversion given by 1 < v < 2, some patients above
the median have also a weight above one (in addition to those below the median), while for v > 2
some patients below the median have a weight below one (in addition to those above the median).
For v > 4, all patients above the median have a weight below 0.5. In this case the extended Gini
coe¢cient heavily discounts the health of patients belonging to the more advantaged groups.






2 , as in Section
4.3.2, the extended Gini coe¢cient is given by (see Appendix for an explicit derivation):



























It is relatively straightforward to see that G (v) is monotonically increasing in v, which is very
intuitive, given the interpretation of this parameter. For a given distribution of health status
across the four patient groups, a higher degree of inequality aversion (measured by v) implies a
higher value of the extended Gini coe¢cient. It is also straightforward to conrm that (41) coincides
with (35) for v = 2.
5.2 Health Achievement Index
As argued by Wagsta¤ (2002), policy makers are likely to care about both the mean health status
of the population and the distribution of health across di¤erent patient groups, and are also likely
willing to trade o¤ increases in health inequality against average health improvements. A policy
objective function that captures this potential trade-o¤ is what Wagsta¤ (2002) denes as an index
of health achievement, given by
I(v) = B(1 G(v)): (42)
If v = 1, inequality considerations have no bearing on overall health achievement, which is then
just given by the mean health status of the population (since G (1) = 0). However, for any v > 1
health inequalities are incorporated into the overall achievement index.
How does increased competition a¤ect overall health achievement? If competition increases both
average health and reduces health inequalities, then I(v) will increase regardless of the inequality
aversion parameter. However, if average health increases and health inequalities also increase,
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then the overall achievement index in (42) gives a tool to assess the trade-o¤ between equity and
e¢ciency. Substituting from (41) into (42), overall health achievement is in our model given by























Thus, overall health achievement is given by the health status of the patients in the worst-
o¤ group (Bh2 ) plus the sum of the health di¤erences between each group and the group ranked
immediately above, where each of these di¤erences is weighted by the relative share of patients
whose health status is at least at the level of the better group in each comparison, raised to the
power of v.
This implies that, all else equal, I increases if the distribution of patients is shifted towards
groups with a better health status, and more so for a larger degree of inequality aversion (v).
Furthermore, for a given patient distribution, @I (v) =@Bki > 0 for all i and k. Thus, for a given
distribution of patients, an increase in the health status of any patient group will increase I.















































The rst term, which is positive, captures the e¤ect that competition increases the health status of
the worst-o¤ group. The second and third terms capture the e¤ects of changes in patient compo-
sition across hospitals and are positive (negative) if competition leads to a higher (lower) market
share for the high-quality hospital. The fourth and fth terms are positive (negative) if competition
leads to more (less) postcode inequality. As we know from Proposition 2, a necessary, but not su¢-
cient, condition for these e¤ects to be positive is that competition leads to quality dispersion. The
nal term in (44) is ambiguous and depends on whether the health inequality between the second
and third ranked group increases or decreases. The term is negative if competition leads to quality
dispersion but might be positive if competition leads to quality convergence (if the concavity of B
is su¢ciently low).
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Even if competition leads to quality convergence, and therefore potentially a reallocation of patients
towards the low-quality hospital, the average health always increases. Consequently, in the absence
of inequality aversion, increased competition always improves the health achievement.
While the exposition in (44) is useful to illustrate the various e¤ects at play, more clear-cut


























































All but the last term (third line) in (46) are unambiguously positive for all v  1, whereas the sign
of the last term is uniquely determined by whether competition increases or reduces the market
share of the high-quality hospital, which in turn depends, in part, on whether competition increases
or reduces postcode inequality. This allows us to arrive at the following general result:
Proposition 5 (i) Regardless of the degree of inequality aversion, a su¢cient, but not necessary,
condition for increased competition to improve the overall health achievement is that the market
share of the high-quality hospital (for each severity type) does not decrease. (ii) Two necessary, but
not su¢cient, conditions for competition to reduce overall health achievement is that the market
share of the high-quality hospital decreases and that the degree of inequality aversion is su¢ciently
large.
As long as the market share of the high-quality hospital does not decrease, competition always
leads to a better overall health achievement, regardless of the degree of inequality aversion. The
e¤ect is even stronger if competition increases the market share of the high-quality hospital, since
this shifts the distribution of patients towards groups with a better health status, which reduces
the (extended) Gini coe¢cient.
What does it take for competition to increase the market share of the high-quality hospital?
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where k 2 f; 1  g is the share of type-k patients. Thus, competition will increase the market
share of the high-quality hospital unless postcode inequality is su¢ciently reduced. An increase in
postcode inequality is therefore a su¢cient (but far from necessary) condition for competition to
improve overall health achievement.
On the other hand, if competition leads to a su¢ciently strong reduction in postcode inequality,
the e¤ect on overall health achievement could potentially be negative, because of a redistribution of
patients towards groups with worse health status. But this would require that the aversion towards
inequality is su¢ciently strong. From (45) we know that @I=@ > 0 for v = 1. By continuity, this
result must hold also for values of v su¢ciently close to 1.
6 Implications for empirical analyses
In this section we discuss possible approaches which could be pursued to test empirically how
competition a¤ects health inequalities. First, to test for the e¤ect of competition on postcode in-
equality, researchers could compute measures of dispersion of health outcomes, such as the standard
deviation or the coe¢cient of variation, within a given hospital catchment area and relate them to
the degree of patient choice and market structure. For example, future empirical work could test
whether in more competitive areas the introduction of patient choice policies lead to an increase or
a reduction in AMI mortality dispersion across hospitals.
Second, to test for the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities across severity levels, a sub-
group analysis by degree of severity may be appropriate. In line with Kessler and Geppert (2005),
high severity could be measured based on the number of previous hospital admissions preceding
a health shock (such as AMI). By comparing the e¤ect of competition on mortality for high- and
low-severity patients, we can infer the e¤ect on health inequalities across severity groups.
Third, the two types of inequality could be brought together by developing a Generalised Gini
or Gini index in a given market area, where patients are ordered by their level of health, i.e.,
starting with patients with highest severity and lowest hospital quality and ending with patients
with lowest severity and highest quality.
Our analysis also illustrates the importance of patient composition e¤ects when measuring
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the e¤ect of competition due to patients with high and low severity exercising choice to a di¤erent
degree. Competition a¤ects di¤erentially the health gains for patients with di¤ering severity but
also changes the number of patients receiving high and low quality through the composition e¤ect.
These will a¤ect both the Gini coe¢cients and the simple measures of dispersion of health outcomes
across hospitals.
The empirical literature which estimates patient choice models as a function of quality and
severity tends to conrm that high-severity patients are more likely to choose high-quality hospitals.
The elasticity of hospital demand to quality are however generally low and so are the interactions
between quality and severity (see Brekke et al., 2014, Section 3.1, for a review of the evidence). We
therefore conjecture that overall composition e¤ects are likely to be small in empirical analyses.
Finally, our analysis highlights the importance of distinguishing empirically between quality and
health outcomes. Although health outcomes are often used as a proxy of hospital quality, our study
highlights how inequalities in qualities do not necessarily go hand-in-hand with inequalities in health
outcomes. In relation to postcode inequality, an increase in inequalities in quality across hospitals
is compatible with a reduction in health inequalities across hospitals if the marginal health gain is
decreasing, so that patients in high-quality hospitals benet less from a given quality increase than
do patients in low-quality hospitals. Similarly, an increase in quality di¤erences across hospitals is
compatible with a reduction in health inequalities across severity types, and this is due to patients
with higher severity beneting more from the increase in quality compared to patients with lower
severity.
7 Concluding remarks
Several OECD countries have introduced pro-market policy interventions in the health sector with
the aim of stimulating quality of care. Such policies are generally contentious and the subject of an
intense political debate. The existing literature has extensively investigated, both theoretically and
empirically, the e¤ect of competition on quality but there is very little work on its impact on equity.
This is surprising given that reduction in health inequalities is an ubiquitous policy objective. Our
study has contributed to ll this gap in knowledge by carefully characterising the conditions under
which competition (i) increases or reduces the gap between high-quality and low-quality hospitals
and, as a result, (ii) contributes to an increase or reduction in health inequalities.
Our rst key nding is that the e¤ect of competition on quality di¤erences between high- and
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low-quality hospitals is generally ambiguous and depends on three key factors related to both
demand and supply of health care: (i) decreasing marginal health gains from quality, which con-
tributes in the direction of quality convergence, (ii) di¤erences in price-cost margins between high-
and low-quality hospitals, which contributes in the direction of quality dispersion, and (iii) quality-
dependent unit treatment costs, which contributes in the direction of quality convergence. The
relative strength of these factors are likely to vary by medical condition, diagnosis and treatment.
For example, standardised treatments such as cataract surgery will have treatment costs mildly
increasing with quality. This may not be the case for more serious treatments, such as a coronary
bypass, where costs will increase more rapidly with quality.
Our second set of key ndings is related to the e¤ect of competition on two di¤erent types of
health inequalities. First, changes in postcode inequality go hand in hand with changes in quality
di¤erences if health gains are linear in quality. However, these health inequalities are more likely
to decrease  regardless of whether competition leads to quality dispersion or quality convergence
 if marginal health gains are decreasing. On the other hand, we nd that competition generally
reduces health inequalities across patients with di¤erent severity, because high-severity patients
benet more from higher quality than do low-severity patients, although this reduction can be
strengthened or weakened by changes in the patient composition at each hospital. Reductions in
inequalities across severity types also drive reductions in the Gini and Generalised Gini coe¢cients,
which aggregate di¤erent sources of health inequalities both across hospitals and severity types.
Our analysis also reveals that using simple measures of dispersion or aggregate measures of
inequality can lead to di¤erent conclusions. In other words, when assessing the e¤ect of compe-
tition on health inequality, the choice of inequality measure potentially matters. For example,
even if competition increases di¤erences in health outcomes across hospitals, the Generalised Gini
coe¢cient may still reduce due to changes in patient composition at each hospital, and the Gini
coe¢cient may reduce further as a result of the overall increase in quality.
In terms of policy implications, our analysis highlights that whether or not competition induces
an equity-e¢ciency trade-o¤ depends on the particular dimension of equity on which policy makers
focus. For example, if policy makers focus on equity related to the postcode lottery, then an
equity-e¢ciency trade-o¤ may arise, though it is less likely to be the case if marginal health gains
from quality decrease at a high rate. On the other hand, an equity-e¢ciency trade-o¤ is less likely
when considering equity across severity types, if more severe patients tend to benet more than low-
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severity ones from increases in quality. If the equity-e¢ciency trade-o¤ is represented by the Health
Achievement Index proposed by Wagsta¤ (2002), which incorporates both of the aforementioned
dimensions of equity, we show that competition always increases the overall health achievement as
long as it does not lead to a redistribution of patients from high-quality to low-quality hospitals.
Our study also provides a theoretical framework to guide future empirical work, which should
focus not only on testing the e¤ect of competition on quality, but also its equity implications. This
can be done, as discussed in Section 6, by developing measures of dispersions in quality and health
outcomes within a given hospital catchment or market area, and then by relating these to changes
in patient choice through consolidated econometric strategies.
The study assumes that quality is uniform within a hospital across di¤erent patients. This
is justied because many aspects of quality involve investments in machines (e.g., CT and MRI)
and technologies with xed costs which benet all patients. However, there may be some aspects
of care (e.g., time that doctors spend with patients) which can vary by patient so that quality
discrimination is possible (as in Ellis, 1998). We leave this possible extension for future research.
Moreover, we assume that health inequalities go hand-in-hand with healthcare inequalities and rule
out other sources of inequalities (e.g., due to location in rural versus urban areas, and socioeconomic
status). In turn, this extension is likely to a¤ect the empirical implications shifting the focus from
pure health inequality to socioeconomic (or other) inequalities in health. Future work could include
other sources of patient heterogeneity in the model, and derive its empirical implications.
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Second-order and stability conditions





































































































































































































































































Derivation of the extended Gini coe¢cient
The extended Gini coe¢cient is given by (39). Using the expression for L (x) from (34), we have
Z 1
0






















































































Solving for the integrals yields
Z 1
0
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After evaluating the integrals, we obtain
Z 1
0
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Bv (v   1)
:
(A16)
By substituting this expression into (39), we obtain the expression given by (41).
39
